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Abstract 
The aim of this paper is to reconstruct Geiger’s realist and Wollheim’s projection-
ist accounts on expressive properties and expressive perception by considering 
them within the larger contexts from which they emerged, by using as far as pos-
sible a common language and by focusing on the questions of the nature of ex-
pressive properties and of how we grasp them. My aim is to show that it is possi-
ble to put into dialogue phenomenological and Anglo-American aesthetics and 
that this dialogue might lead to new insights about how we engage with art. 
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1. A dialogue between phenomenological and Anglo-American aesthetics  
 
In recent years, philosophers working in the field of aesthetics have 
become increasingly interested in explaining how we are able to per-
ceive qualities expressing emotional states in both nature and works 
of art. We speak of the cheerfulness of a landscape, the serenity of a 
poem, the melancholy of a painting, the sadness of a film, and so on. 
These examples do not refer to the emotional expressions of particu-
lar humans, or human-like figures or animals appearing in these 
works, but to properties which seem to be expressed by natural ob-
jects and by art works themselves. Contemporary philosophers em-
ploy different names to refer to this phenomenon. On the one hand, 
authors inspired by the phenomenological tradition deploy the con-
cepts of “moods”, “atmospheres” and “characters”; they also speak 
of “quasi objective feelings” and of “half-things”. In this context, the 
works of Gernot Böhme and Tonino Griffero have received wide at-                                                             
1 ingrid.vendrell@uni-jena.de. 
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tention (Böhme 2001; 2006; Griffero 2014; 2017). Both authors de-
velop their respective accounts within the conceptual frame of the 
Neue Phänomenologie – a line of thought inaugurated by Hermann 
Schmitz, for whom emotions are to be understood literally (and not 
metaphorically) as atmospheres (Schmitz 2005: 343; 2007a: 32; 
2007b: 269). More recent accounts attempt to focus on Heidegger’s 
theory of “moods” (Stimmungen) to explain this phenomenon (see 
Trigg 2018). Yet long before these developments, the realist phe-
nomenologist Moritz Geiger dedicated one of his most impressive 
studies to the problem of “feeling characters” (Gefühlscharakteren, 
1911), while Dietrich von Hildebrand examined the nature of “expres-
sive qualities” (Gefühlsqualitäten) in the two volumes of his master 
work Ästhetik (1977; 1984) 2. On the other hand, and more in line 
with the analytical tradition, Anglo-American authors refer to these 
qualities as “expressive” or “emotional properties”, and less frequent-
ly as “atmospheric properties”. The nature of such properties has 
been the subject of a lively and ongoing discussion (especially in the 
field of music) between Peter Kivy, Stephen Davies, Malcolm Budd, 
Jerrold Levinson and Paul Noordhof, to mention but a few (Kivy 1990; 
Davies 1994; Budd 1995; Levinson 1996; Noordhof 2008). Part of this 
discussion has been articulated as a critique of a singular proposal 
presented by Richard Wollheim during the eighties (1987). However, 
despite this common interest in explaining “expressive properties”, 
both discussions – the phenomenological and the Anglo-American – 
have developed in parallel, without really coming into contact with 
one another. Against this background, this paper seeks to bring the 
two aesthetics into dialogue by focusing on the work of Moritz Geiger 
and Richard Wollheim, whose early accounts of this phenomenon 
paved the way for later discussions in their respective traditions.  
The focus on these two authors is justified by the following rea-
sons. First of all, both of these authors, in different ways, influenced 
the debate on expressive properties within their respective traditions. 
Geiger’s work can be regarded as representative of the phenomeno-
logical approach. The spirit of his realist account of “characters” re-
mains alive in more recent developments on “atmospheres” in the 
sense that these phenomena are considered to be things which are                                                              
2 For an insightful account on expressive properties in the tradition of Austrian 
philosophy see Mulligan 2015. In this paper, Mulligan points to the difference be-
tween values and atmospheres in the phenomenological tradition.  
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present and which can be experienced by the subject independently 
of one’s present affective state. Wollheim’s work, on the contrary, is 
not representative of Anglo-American aesthetics, but it has been 
highly influential since it questions many of the assumptions of ana-
lytic philosophy. Wollheim introduces a psychoanalytical mechanism 
to explain expressive properties as resulting from our ability to pro-
ject our emotions onto the world. This account was subject to cri-
tique, and in the process new and different forms for understanding 
expressive properties were produced. Secondly, at least at first sight, 
the explanations they give concerning the nature of expressive prop-
erties could not be more different: while Geiger offers a realist ap-
proach, Wollheim explains expressive properties as the result of a 
projection. However, behind these differences, I will show that a 
careful reading reveals important analogies between both authors. 
These analogies are derived from their shared interest in offering a 
careful description of experience. 
In order to establish this hypothetical dialogue between authors 
(and traditions), a reconstruction of both theories is needed. One im-
portant caveat for this reconstruction is needed here: the authors it 
puts into dialogue are from different time periods and different intel-
lectual backgrounds. We should certainly not lose sight of this fact. 
Indeed, at first glance, the two authors seem to have little in com-
mon. Moritz Geiger (1880-1937) developed his account at the begin-
ning of the last century and within a specific intellectual framework. 
He was a psychologist and a phenomenologist; at that time the divi-
sion between the two disciplines was not clear, so it was usual for 
philosophers to work on empirical research, and Geiger was not alone 
in this enterprise (other good examples are Stephan Witasek and the 
authors of the Graz School). He was influenced by Husserl, and also 
by Pfänder and Lipps, who were two crucial figures of the Munich Cir-
cle of early phenomenology. As a phenomenologist, his main aim was 
to “go back to the things themselves”, and to examine how different 
phenomena (such as emotions, empathy, attention, consciousness, 
etc.) are given in experience. Geiger had a strong interest in aesthet-
ics and as a follower of Lipps he focused part of his research on “em-
pathy” (Einfühlung). Like many other early phenomenologists, Geiger 
endorsed a realist account of expressive (and other) properties. Un-
like Geiger, Richard Wollheim (1923-2003) was not a phenomenolo-
gist in the sense in which this term is used to refer to an author be-
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longing to the tradition inaugurated by Husserl and Pfänder, and fur-
ther developed by Scheler, Heidegger or Sartre. Nevertheless, Woll-
heim’s work aims at offering a phenomenological account of our ex-
perience of art and it does so by appealing to a distinctive phenome-
nology that we find in paintings and by focusing on subjective proper-
ties of the experience of art. Thus, it is not surprising that Richard El-
dridge described Wollheim’s work in Art and its objects as an enter-
prise of “descriptive phenomenology” (Eldridge 1980: IX). Wollheim’s 
main influences are Wittgenstein and psychoanalysis, especially the 
work of Freud, but he was also familiar with Sartre and Merleau-
Ponty. One of his main goals was to explain the importance of art for 
human nature and his work aims at explaining the phenomena of 
“expression” and the “correspondence” between our mind and some 
aspects of the world (Budd 2008: 239; 2012: 181). As we can see, the 
intellectual contexts in which these authors worked are extremely dif-
ferent and some effort is required to bring them into dialogue. I will 
employ three strategies in this paper to counter this problem. First, I 
will consider their works within the larger intellectual and historical 
frameworks in which they were developed, and I will point to their re-
spective interlocutors. This will enable the reader to contextualize 
both approaches, but also to realize that, despite their differences, 
both authors shared a common interest in developing an accurate 
description of our engagement with art.  
Second, to enable the dialogue and for the sake of clarity, a com-
mon language is needed. For this, I will make some terminological de-
cisions and use the terms “expressive properties” for what Geiger 
calls “feeling characters”, “characters” or “atmospheres” and for 
what Wollheim calls “projective properties”. More generally, I will use 
the term “expressive property” to refer, for instance, to the cheerful-
ness, melancholy, serenity, sadness, or gloom, etc. of an object (the 
term “object” is used here in a broad sense and it entails things, per-
sons, creatures, events, states of affairs, etc.). The expression “ex-
pressive property” is adequate because it underscores that we are 
dealing with qualities, aspects, shapes, i.e., properties which seem to 
be expressed by the object. In a similar fashion, I will refer to our ca-
pacity to grasp, disclose, sense or become aware of such properties 
as “expressive perception”. Wollheim defined this term as follows: 
“By expressive perception I mean – for I shall restrict myself to vision 
– that capacity we have which enables us, on looking at a painting, to 
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see it as expressing, for instance melancholy, or turbulence, or sereni-
ty” (1987: 80). I borrow this definition from Wollheim because it re-
flects the immediacy and spontaneity with which the disclosure of 
such properties takes place and their intimate bond to our perceptive 
capabilities. But while my paper draws on this expression, I do not 
commit myself to Wollheim’s other claims, according to which ex-
pressive perception is the result of a complex projection of our emo-
tions onto objects of the world.  
Finally, I will articulate the reconstruction of these positions by fo-
cusing on a question shared by both authors: do expressive proper-
ties depend on the mental states of the subjects who experience 
them or do they have a reality of their own? To put it differently: are 
the cheerfulness of the landscape, the serenity of the poem, the mel-
ancholy of the painting, the sadness of the film, etc. qualities which 
are to be objectively found in the landscape, the poem, the painting 
and the film, or are these qualities mere projections of our own emo-
tional states onto these particular objects? The question is thorny 
and, as I will show, Geiger and Wollheim offer quite different answers 
to it, all the while sharing the assumption that we experience these 
properties as belonging to the world. As I have already advanced, 
Geiger is a realist, while Wollheim argues for a projectionist theory. 
What is important here, however, is that despite their fundamentally 
different answers to this question, both authors take as their point of 
departure two important intuitions of our experience. First of all, 
there is a linguistic fact, the significance of which has not gone unno-
ticed. We speak of psychological states such as cheerfulness, serenity, 
melancholy, sadness, etc. and we employ exactly the same terms to 
speak of expressive properties (whether we call them atmospheres, 
moods, characters, emotional or atmospheric properties), such as the 
cheerfulness of the painting, the serenity of the poem, etc. Rather 
than being a mere vagary of language, this linguistic fact suggests 
some kind of connection between affective states and expressive 
properties. The second intuition goes in another direction. Despite 
employing the same terms to refer to both psychological states and 
expressive properties, we are reluctant to assimilate one phenome-
non to the other. That is, the landscape is not cheerful just because 
we feel cheerful in contemplating it, the poem is not serene because 
we are serene while reciting it, etc. Geiger and Wollheim will also of-
fer an answer to this, i.e., they try to explain how it is possible that 
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such cheerfulness, serenity, etc. are experienced as belonging to the 
world and as such are independent of our present mental state. The 
point at issue here is that such qualities cannot be simply reduced to 
mental states: they are experienced as having a life of their own.  
These three strategies provide a common ground for presenting 
and discussing Geiger’s realist and Wollheim’s projectionist accounts. 
In what follows, I will reconstruct both approaches by considering 
them within the larger contexts from which they emerged, by using 
as far as possible a common language and by focusing on the ques-
tion of the nature of expressive properties. My main aim is recon-
structive and therefore I will not enter into a discussion about the va-
lidity of each theory. This would serve as material for another paper, 
but here I am pursuing a different goal: namely, to show that it is pos-
sible to put into dialogue phenomenological and Anglo-American aes-
thetics and that this dialogue might lead to new insights about how 
we engage with art.  
 
 
2. Geiger’s realist account in the context of early phenomenology 
 
2.1. Moods, feeling characters and feeling tones 
Geiger’s main aim in Zum Problem der Stimmungseinfühlung (On the 
problem of mood empathy, 1911) is to offer an account of how we 
experience “life” in inanimate objects in nature and, particularly, in 
art. The specific phenomenon he has in mind is what I describe above 
as expressive properties, but which he terms as “feeling characters” 
(Gefühlscharakteren), or, more frequently, just “characters” (Charak-
teren) or, occasionally, “atmospheres” (Atmosphären). His examples 
are clear in this regard: we claim to feel the cheerfulness of a land-
scape, the tranquility of the color blue, the festivity of the violet, the 
joviality of music, etc. Geiger offers a realist approach to the nature of 
expressive properties and the way in which we “grasp” them, but he 
also attempts to link these questions to a crucial concept in his aes-
thetics: the concept of empathy3.                                                              
3 At that time, empathy was mainly used to explain how we engage with non-
human objects in art and nature. Only later the term was used to explain a form 
of apprehending the mental states of other human beings. In his Ästhetik (1903), 
Lipps distinguished four main types of empathy: empathy of activity, empathy of 
mood, empathy into nature, and empathy into the sensuous experience of other 
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Geiger’s paper begins by presenting two theories which were dis-
cussed widely at the time: the “effect theory” (Wirkungstheorie) and 
the “animation theory” (Belebungstheorie)4. According to the first, to 
say that a landscape is cheerful is to say that we feel cheerful. In 
these cases, there is a projection of my feeling onto the landscape. 
Given this description, we could, in my view, also call this theory a 
“projection theory”. According to the “animation theory”, we believe 
that we find some kind of feeling in the landscape. The theory pre-
sented by Geiger in his paper, however, does not fit into either of 
these paradigms.  
Geiger proceeds by focusing his analysis on the expressive proper-
ties of colors5. One of his main findings is that the subjects of his 
study described the expressive properties of colors not as a projec-
tion of their own emotional states onto the color in question, but as 
something independent of their own mental states. The cheerfulness 
of the color is experienced as something found in the object, i.e., as a 
property of the object (Geiger 1976: 24). In fact, this property is de-
scribed as spreading over the objects, as a glow (Schimmer) that ap-
pears to be part of the color. To refer to this property, Geiger coins 
the term “character” (Charakter, 1976: 26). 
Interestingly, Geiger also finds that the cheerfulness of the color is 
described in different terms from the cheerfulness of a face. In his 
view, expressive properties cannot be assimilated to bodily expres-
sions of an emotion. The main difference is that the cheerfulness of 
the color (its character) is experienced as a property of the color in 
terms similar to the intensity and the quality of the color, which are 
its properties. However, the cheerfulness of a face has an expressive 
function, i.e., it reflects a moment of the emotional state of the other 
person, and it would be a mistake to describe this cheerfulness as a                                                                                                                             
human beings. Geiger, in his text on Stimmungseinfühlung, focuses on the second 
type of Lipps’ taxonomy (1903: 96-223).  
4 Geiger’s study masterfully combines conceptual analysis with empirical re-
search. However, in this paper, I will focus on his philosophical findings and leave 
aside questions about the validity of the empirical method employed.  
5 For the sake of clarity, he starts his analysis by focusing on colors (in comparison 
to the complexity of analyzing a landscape painting, for instance, colors are much 
easier to examine). In the later part of his study, Geiger applies his findings to the 
expressive properties of words and art objects. See the second volume of Dietrich 
von Hildebrand’s Aesthetics for another early phenomenological analysis of the 
“expressive qualities of words and expressions” (Hildebrand 1984: 268-74).  
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property of the face. Notice that I say similar here, because the ex-
pressive property as a property of the color is not identical to the 
properties of the intensity and the quality of the color. While intensity 
and quality are integral parts or elements (Bestandteile) of the sensa-
tion of color, the “character” of the color is not an integral part of its 
sensation, but something that “spreads over” the color, i.e., it is 
somehow experienced as being more independent of the sensation of 
color than its intensity and quality.  
Both findings are important to understand the nature of charac-
ters. In Geiger’s view, characters are not to be conflated with feelings, 
emotions or moods (Geiger refers here to different types of affective 
states, but mainly he speaks of “moods”: Stimmungen). That is, the 
cheerfulness of a color is not an affective state, as when we claim to 
be cheerful. In adopting this position decisively, he rejects the claim 
shared by the effect and animation theories, according to which such 
characters are feelings. Indeed, the effect theory – or, as I have called 
it, the projection theory – claims that the color is cheerful because I 
am cheerful. And the animation theory somehow attributes life to the 
color, so that the experience of the cheerfulness of the color is ex-
plained in the same terms as the experience of the cheerfulness of 
other persons. Geiger’s argument against these views goes as follows: 
the cheerfulness of a color is not experienced as something pertain-
ing to the self, but as something that is objectively present in the col-
or. Thus, this cheerfulness cannot be regarded as an affective state 
(feeling, emotion, or mood) because affective states are states of the 
self and as such are subjective in nature (Geiger 1976: 30). As a result, 
characters (such as the cheerfulness of the color) and moods (such as 
my cheerful psychological state) are different phenomena and should 
not be conflated.  
In this argument, Geiger’s realism about characters becomes 
clear. Characters are presented to us as having an objective reality. 
This realist approach toward expressive properties (in Geiger’s terms: 
characters, feeling characters or atmospheres) is not surprising if we 
consider this claim within the broader context of early phenomenolo-
gy. Indeed, it was quite common among early phenomenologists be-
longing to the Munich and Gottingen circles to embrace realist posi-
tions on properties. An illustration of this shared realist view on prop-
erties is the doctrine of value realism (also called axiological realism), 
according to which axiological or evaluative properties (in early phe-
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nomenological terms: value qualities) exist independently of the emo-
tional reactions of the subjects who experience them. Value realism 
was embraced in one version or another by all early phenomenolo-
gists. Its most prominent defense was offered by Scheler, who de-
fended a robust version of this doctrine. For instance, in his Formal-
ism book, Scheler considers the “perception” of values to be prior to 
the perception of their bearers (Scheler 1973). Husserl’s position is 
different, because he attributes a constitutive role to the subjects 
who experience values; however, in his theory “values are disclosed 
rather than created” (Drummond 2002: 8). Different versions of value 
realism were also embraced by Edith Stein, José Ortega y Gasset, and 
Dietrich von Hildebrand, to name but a few. However, value realism 
was not the only form of realism embraced in the context of early 
phenomenology and Geiger’s text is a good example of this. In the 
text analyzed in this paper, Geiger is not concerned with values, but 
with characters. Put otherwise: he is not concerned with axiological 
or evaluative properties, but with what I have called expressive prop-
erties6. What Geiger does in this text is to defend a realist position on 
characters, according to which they are present in the world as they 
are experienced7. We find a similar account in von Hildebrand’s Aes-
thetics, where he argues that the cheerfulness of the sky is an objec-
tive property of the sky given intuitively to us (von Hildebrand 1977: 
174). A similar position seems to be held by Stein, for whom moods 
have objective correlates. Following the vocabulary of Husserl, she 
speaks of the objective correlates of moods as “colorations” (Fär-
bungen, Stein 1989: 92)8. However, Stein does not delve into the na-
ture of such “colorations”.  
Geiger’s main focus is to show that the character (expressive 
property) is one thing and the mood which we are in is another. In his 
account, it is possible to experience expressive properties without be-                                                             
6 The examples used by Geiger in his text allow one to interpret characters as ex-
pressive properties. However, I leave aside here the question of whether all char-
acters can be regarded in this way and whether all expressive properties would 
be characters.  
7 Paul Noordhoff (2008: 330) observes that in contemporary aesthetics there is 
no similar realist defense of expressive properties. He is right in claiming that the 
majority of accounts are today inspired by dispositionalist and projectivist ac-
counts. However, his diagnosis ignores all the contributions on atmospheres de-
veloped within the paradigm of the Neue Phänomenologie.  
8 See Zirión 2018 for a detailed study of Husserl’s account of colorations. 
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ing in an emotional state. Moreover, we are in fact able to experience 
such properties despite being in an affective state which contrasts 
with the property experienced: we see the cheerfulness of the color, 
despite being depressed. However, despite the force of this realist 
argument, Geiger must still explain the above-mentioned linguistic 
feature whereby we employ the same terms for both expressive 
properties and affective states (mainly moods), i.e., we speak of the 
cheerfulness of the color and of the cheerful mood. For this phenom-
enon, Geiger offers two explanations:  
a) the Causal Explanation. First, Geiger observes a causal connection 
between both phenomena. It is often the case that a cheerful land-
scape puts us in a cheerful mood. This kind of causal relation helps us 
understand why the character has the same name as the mood that 
we are predisposed to feel when experiencing it.  
b) The Explanation of the Qualitative Similarity. The second explana-
tion is more complex. According to Geiger, the link between the ex-
pressive property and the affective state goes even deeper and he 
points to what seems to be an intrinsic link between the two. In order 
to explain it, he distinguishes two sides, or moments, of the affective 
state:9 a subjective side and an objective side, for which he coins the 
name “feeling tone” (Gefühlston, Geiger 1976: 35). Notice that this 
distinction is introduced only for analytical purposes, since for Geiger 
the mood is experienced as a unitary state. In sadness, in joy, in ha-
tred, etc., we feel ourselves sad, joyous, hating, etc. (this is the sub-
jective side), but these affective states have the ability to “color” the 
objects they target (this is the objective side because it has its effect 
on our perception of the object, see Geiger 1976: 33). Thus, when we 
experience an affective state, this state dyes, tinctures or impreg-
nates with a coloration (Färbung) the targeted objects, giving them a 
brilliance (Glanz). The reason why we do not usually notice the objec-
tive side of an affective state is that we normally feel overwhelmed by 
how our feelings, emotions and moods affect us (the subjective side). 
As Geiger puts it: “the subjective moments of anger and cheerfulness, 
enthusiasm and love are so pronounced that one tends to overlook 
that in these experiences there also belongs something given in the 
object, that these experiences do not leave the objects they are di-                                                             
9 Here, for instance, Geiger speaks of Gefühle, a polysemic term that encom-
passes feelings, emotions, and also moods.  
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rected toward unaffected, but spread a specific brilliance on them” 
(my translation, 1976: 35).  
Now, the question is how the objective side of our affective state 
relates to the expressive property, i.e., how the “feeling tone” (Ge-
fühlston) is related to the “feeling character” (Gefühlscharakter). Gei-
ger, whose analysis focuses largely on colors (and later also on words 
and expressions) puts the question in the following terms: “How does 
the cheerfulness of the color relate to the objective side of my cheer-
ful mood, to the glow that my cheerful mood spreads over the ob-
jects?” (my translation, 1976: 36). Remember that both terms refer to 
different phenomena. The feeling tone is something that belongs to 
the affective state of the subject (the objective side of the affective 
state, to be more precise), while the feeling character is experienced 
as being objectively present in the object; how then do the two phe-
nomena relate to one another? Geiger’s answer is that there is a 
qualitative similarity between both, which makes it unsurprising that 
we employ the same term for both phenomena. My mood projects a 
specific glow, light or brilliance onto the objects it targets, and this 
glow, light or brilliance is, in terms of its qualitative feel, similar to the 
feeling characters.  
 
2.2. Grasping characters, immersion and empathy 
In respect of the nature of expressive properties (feeling characters, 
characters or atmospheres in Geiger’s terms), Geiger defends a realist 
position. However, he has still to explain how we grasp such expres-
sive properties. Geiger puts the question as follows: “we have not yet 
spoken of how we grasp (erfassen) this object in our consciousness, 
the cheerfulness of the color, the melancholy of the landscape” (my 
translation, 1976: 41). Translated into the language of contemporary 
aesthetics, this is the question of how expressive perception occurs. 
Note that this translation is only appropriate if we use the term “per-
ception” in a very broad sense. Geiger does not speak directly of a 
“perception”, he employs the term “grasp” (erfassen), which suggests 
a sui generis form of disclosure that is irreducible to perception in the 
ordinary sense in which we employ this word (that is, for the percep-
tion of objects in our environment). Moreover, this translation of 
“grasp” is only justified in those cases where “expressive properties” 
are grasped, but in Geiger’s view we are able to grasp not only ex-
pressive but also evaluative properties (in the latter case, where we 
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grasp a value, it would be incorrect to speak of expressive percep-
tion). That being said, there are important reasons justifying the use 
of the term “expressive perception” to describe what Geiger has in 
mind. First, with the use of the term “grasp”, Geiger refers to exactly 
what Wollheim has defined as expressive perception, i.e., a capacity 
that enables us to see a work of art as expressing melancholy, or tur-
bulence, or serenity. Secondly, the term “perception”, like the term 
“grasp”, suggests an immediacy and spontaneity in accessing aspects 
of the world. Finally, by using this term, Geiger’s realist position is 
presented in a language that enables a dialogue with authors with a 
background other than phenomenology.  
Like the other realist phenomenologists before him, Scheler and 
Reinach, Geiger takes for granted that we have a capacity to disclose, 
grasp, experience or feel properties (for evaluative properties, see 
Scheler 1973: 259; Reinach 1989: 295). This is a sui generis capacity 
that is irreducible to emotion or belief. We do not say that the land-
scape is cheerful because we grasp this cheerfulness as an emotion 
(as I have already said, we can see the cheerfulness of the landscape 
despite being depressed), nor do we say it because we judge the 
landscape to be such (we do not apply general categories to a specific 
case in order to evaluate it). Now, to return to the question of how 
expressive properties are experienced, Geiger’s answer is that charac-
ters can be grasped, and this grasp is a kind of (non-propositional) 
form of “knowing” which makes aspects of the world accessible to us. 
To put it another way: expressive properties are given to us in expres-
sive perception.  
For the disclosure of expressive properties, the attitude in which 
we find ourselves is not irrelevant. In fact, Geiger observes that feel-
ing characters can be apprehended in different attitudes (1976: 41). 
He primarily distinguishes between, on the one hand, a “contempla-
tive attitude” (betrachtende Einstellung), in which we contemplate 
the cheerfulness of the color and experience it as something objec-
tive and external, and, on the other, an “immersive attitude” (auf-
nehmende Einstellung), in which we not only perceive the feeling 
character but are also immersed (versenken) in it10. His main concern                                                              
10 For a discussion and critique of Geiger’s account, see Griffero (2014: 109, 132, 
134). However, note that Griffero employs a different terminology from that 
proposed in this paper. Griffero’s criticism of Geiger is motivated by a different 
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is with this latter attitude, which, for the sake of clarity, I will refer to 
as “immersion”, and he offers an elaborated taxonomy of its different 
types. According to this typology, there are four forms of immersion: 
a) Objective Immersion. In this attitude we open ourselves up to the 
feeling character (i.e., the expressive property), but we remain pas-
sive towards it. Despite grasping the character, we do not actively 
adopt an attitude towards it. In these cases, we experience the feel-
ing character as an “atmosphere” (Atmosphäre, Geiger 1976: 45) 
spreading within us. For this reason, it is possible that we interpret 
this atmosphere as a feeling, although in fact it is not our feeling, but 
something objective. 
b) Position-Taking Immersion. Here we grasp the character (i.e., the 
expressive property) but we also adopt a stance towards it. We see 
the character of a landscape and we see it as depressed and hollow, 
and this impression differs from the one we have when the landscape 
is cheerful and lovely. We then enter into an interplay with the land-
scape. We grasp the feeling character of the landscape, we adopt a 
stance towards it, and in turn this stance influences the way in which 
we perceive the character of the landscape. Thus, when I experience 
the landscape as depressed and hollow, I am able to experience 
something of these qualities in myself. The boundaries between the 
feeling character and my affective state are not clear; rather, there is 
an interdependence between them.  
c) Sentimental Immersion. While the last two attitudes share an in-
terest in the object, this is not the case with the sentimental attitude. 
Rather than grasping the feeling character of the landscape, this atti-
tude relates to how this character influences our own affective states. 
This attitude is characterized by an active search for resonance, that 
is, for recreating in one’s own consciousness the character of the 
landscape. Hence, our attention is directed not at the object, but ra-
ther at the affective state elicited by it. The object is just a pretext for 
letting a mood arise in us. In cases of sentimental immersion, the 
feeling character of the landscape and my affective state converge, 
making it difficult to draw a line between the two phenomena.  
d) Empathic Immersion. Finally, it is also possible that we empathize 
with the feeling character. Empathy (Einfühlung) is not employed 
here to mean a form of social cognition, but a state in which a total                                                                                                                             
conceptualization of the notion of “atmosphere”, one which is inspired by Neue 
Phänomenologie as well as Gestalt psychology.  
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absorption by the other has taken place. In empathic immersion we 
are completely absorbed by the character and become one with it 
(eins warden, Geiger 1976: 53). However, this form of immersion dif-
fers from the sentimental immersion in a crucial respect. In senti-
mental immersion, the object is regarded as simply a means to elicit 
affective reactions, and we care about it only because it produces af-
fective states in which we can indulge. By contrast, in empathic im-
mersion, we are able to grasp the character at the same time that it 
produces in us a corresponding mood. Nevertheless, character and 
mood are not presented as two separate phenomena. It is not the 
case that on the one hand we have a character and on the other we 
have a mood. Geiger describes what happens as a situation in which a 
single mood has its origins in two different places: the object and the 
self are not the same thing, but they converge by virtue of a shared 
mood (1976: 54). The focus is on the mood rather than the object; we 
are aware that we experience a mood, but we are also aware that this 
mood is a form of re-experiencing an aspect or property of the ob-
ject.  
Although, in Zum Problem der Stimmungseinfühlung, Geiger does 
not delve into the value of each of these forms of immersion for our 
appreciation of art, he presents some firm opinions on the matter in a 
work published two years later: Beiträge zur Phänomenologie des 
ästhetischen Genusses (Contributions to a phenomenology of aesthet-
ic pleasure, 1913). In the Beiträge, Geiger distinguishes two forms of 
participation in art: one is described as “inner concentration” (Innen-
konzentration), while the other is described as “outer concentration” 
(Außenkonzentration, 1974: 664). With “inner concentration”, the 
subject addresses herself/himself towards the “inside”, focusing on 
the affective states aroused by a work of art with the aim of enjoying 
them. With “outer concentration”, the subject addresses herself/him-
self to the work, its features, its values and characters. This form of 
participation is “disinterested”: the subject remains in control of 
her/his feelings, emotions and moods. Usually our engagement with 
art involves both kinds of participation, so these terms are in fact an 
abstraction of how we engage with works of art. However, for Geiger, 
if we focus on what we feel then we are enjoying our affective states 
and not the work itself. Thus, the pleasure experienced through “in-
ner concentration” is a pseudo-aesthetic pleasure because the work 
is used merely as a pretext to feel emotions and to indulge in them. 
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Genuine aesthetic pleasure requires the “disconnection of the self” as a 
means of focusing on the object as such: this is only possible through 
“outer concentration” (see Geiger 1974: 664). The form of participation 
that Geiger describes in the Beiträge as “inner concentration” has 
strong similarities with the “sentimental immersion” as described in 
Zum Problem der Stimmungseinfühlung. 
Geiger’s skepticism towards the function of our affective states for 
the participation and appreciation of art works is embedded in a larger 
intellectualist tradition for which the emotions, feelings and moods, ra-
ther than enabling the understanding and valuing of art works, distract 
us from their relevant aspects. Susan Feagin has coined the expression 
“the intellectual view of appreciation” to refer to this view, according to 
which affective states risk taking our attention away from what we 
ought to be attending to in the work (2013: 636). A similar position was 
defended by the phenomenologist Ortega y Gasset in La deshumani-
zación del arte (2002: 852). Throughout its significant history, howev-
er, what this intellectualist view seems to ignore is something which 
early phenomenologists made us aware of: that emotions might play 
an important function in indicating to us the evaluative and expres-
sive properties embodied within a work of art11.  
 
 
3. Wollheim’s Freudian account in Anglo-American aesthetics 
 
3.1. Expressive perception as complex projection  
Geiger’s realist account represents a radical rejection of projectionist 
theories on the nature of expressive properties. However, within An-
glo-American aesthetics, one of the most prominent and widely dis-
cussed contributions on the nature of expressive perception employs 
the mechanism of projection to explain it. Richard Wollheim’s Paint-
ing as an art (1987) devotes part of the chapter What the spectator 
sees precisely to this question and uses a Freudian model to offer a 
projectionist explanation of expressive perception. In his view, ex-
pressive perception is a function of projection, i.e., it can be explained 
as the projection of a mental state onto the world. For Wollheim, the 
concept of projection is intimately connected to the key concept of 
his philosophy of art: “correspondence”. Expression, projection and                                                              
11 I offer a defense of the role of emotions in the appreciation of art in Vendrell 
Ferran (2018: 204-23). 
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correspondence are, therefore, three closely linked and interacting 
concepts in Wollheim’s work. First, I will focus on expressive percep-
tion, before considering expressive properties in the following section 
(given the function of projection, it is not accidental that in this sec-
tion on Wollheim the order of exposition is precisely the reverse of 
what it was in the case of Geiger, who defends a realist account of 
expressive properties).  
Like Geiger, Wollheim tries to provide answers to two central 
questions: what is the nature of expressive properties, and how can 
they be experienced? And, like Geiger, Wollheim takes our own expe-
rience as his point of departure. More specifically, he is interested in 
the phenomenology of pictorial meaning. However, unlike Geiger, 
Wollheim offers an account in which the artist’s intention plays a role 
in explaining how we come to perceive expressive properties in works 
of art. In particular, this intentionalist view will be helpful in explain-
ing the notion of correspondence. 
In Painting as an art, Wollheim poses the question: “What is it 
then to see a painting as expressing melancholy, or turbulence, or se-
renity? Is it, for instance, a genuine species of seeing or is the notion 
of seeing used here in a loose or extended sense as when I say that I 
see the force of an argument, or the need for disagreeable action?” 
(Wollheim 1987: 80). Wollheim argues resolutely for the first view, 
according to which expressive perception is a genuine form of seeing. 
Expressive perception is for him a sui generis form of seeing in the 
same sense that “seeing-in” – another key concept of his aesthetics 
(that is distinct from Wittgenstein’s notion of “seeing-as”) – is also a 
sui generis form of seeing appropriate to representations. Both forms 
of seeing are species of perception. While expressive perception gives 
us access to the expressive qualities of art works, “seeing-in” enables 
us to see something represented in a picture (as when we claim to 
“see” Napoleon in a painting – i.e., when looking at the surface of a 
painting we discern the figure of Napoleon)12. In describing expres-
sive perception, he writes:  
                                                              
12 The concept of “seeing-in” was developed in the second edition of Art and its 
objects (Wollheim 1980: 137). In Painting as an art (1987), Wollheim analyzes 
this concept further and also focuses on expressive seeing as another species of 
perception.  
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I believe that expressive perception is a genuine species of seeing, and it is 
for this reason that it is capable of grounding a distinctive variety of pictorial 
meaning. However, expressive perception is not a narrowly visual capacity, 
for not only does it, like all species of seeing, presuppose beliefs, which in 
turn derive from a certain experience of the world, but it also presupposes a 
deep part of our psychology, which consists in a mechanism for coping with 
feelings, moods, and emotions. (Wollheim 1987: 80) 
 
That is, expressive perception is a form of perception in which our 
feelings, moods and emotions are implicated. In fact, in Wollheim’s 
view, it is a form of perception related to the way in which we deal 
with our emotional states.  
To understand how our affective state affects expressive percep-
tion, Wollheim suggests that we compare it with two similar experi-
ences.  
a) The first kind of experience occurs when we are in the grip of an 
emotion and this emotional state tinctures, dyes and colors every-
thing in our environment. If we enjoy success, the happiness experi-
enced makes the world appear a wonderful place. According to Woll-
heim, this happens not because the world is such a place, but be-
cause we are in a certain emotional state. In this case “the emotion 
flows from us to what we perceive” (Wollheim 1987: 82).  
b) The second experience is of a different kind. We can experience a 
landscape as having the mood of aloneness and despair. We are able 
to perceive such moods independently of our present emotional 
state. Here “the emotion flows from what we perceive to us”, i.e., our 
emotion responds to what the world looks like (Wollheim 1987: 82). 
The phenomenon of expressive perception is prefigured by the sec-
ond kind of experience in which something perceived gives rise to an 
emotion in us. Wollheim approaches it via the concept of “corre-
spondence”.  
Notice here a striking analogy with Geiger. Wollheim’s first experi-
ence, in which the emotions dye everything we perceive, describes 
the phenomenon that Geiger calls “feeling tone” (Gefühlston), i.e., 
the “objective” moment of our affective experience. The feeling tone 
refers to the capacity of our affective states to color, dye, tincture the 
objects targeted. Wollheim’s second experience, in which an emotion 
flows to us from what we perceive, relates to what Geiger calls “feel-
ing characters”, “characters” or “atmospheres”, and which I have in-
terpreted as the expressive properties experienced as the presence of 
objective qualities. For Wollheim, as for Geiger, expressive perception 
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is a question of the second kind of experience. However, as I shall 
show, unlike Geiger, Wollheim considers that the expressive proper-
ties, though experienced independently of our affective condition, 
are the result of a complex mechanism in which we project our affec-
tive state onto the world13. Thus, in Wollheim’s view, the second 
phenomenon also implies the first. 
According to Wollheim, expressive perception is characterized by 
the following moments. First, the emotional aspect does not stand 
apart from the perception through which it is invoked. As he puts it: 
“In expressive perception it is not enough that what is perceived in-
vokes the corresponding emotion: the emotion must effect how we 
perceive what we perceive. Expressed emotion and perception fuse” 
(Wollheim 1987: 82). Secondly, the correspondence between our 
emotional state and an aspect of the world occurs in a process of pro-
jection. As Wollheim understands it, “projection is a process in which 
emotions or feelings flow from us to what we perceive” (1987: 82). 
Thus, although expressive perception is prefigured by the second kind 
of experience in which we perceive a mood in an object in our envi-
ronment, it also has something in common with the first kind of expe-
rience in which we project an emotional state onto the world. As 
Malcolm Budd has put it, in Wollheim, correspondence is “a relation 
between some part of the external world and an emotion, mood or 
feeling that the part of the external world is capable of invoking in vir-
tue of how it looks” (Budd 2008: 241). We experience the world as 
corresponding to certain emotions and in experiencing this corre-
spondence an emotion can be induced in us. 
Against this background, Wollheim seeks to explain expressive 
perception in terms of projection. Projection is used as a terminus 
technicus in his account, in which meaning cannot be reduced to the 
mere attribution of our own mental states to objects in our environ-
ment. In fact, according to him, projection can come in two forms:  
a) in a “simple projection”, a person is sad and projects her/his sad-
ness onto a figure of the environment so that s/he no longer believes 
that s/he is sad, but thinks that what is really sad is the figure in 
her/his environment.                                                               
13 Note that despite labeling Wollheim’s position as projectionism, his projection-
ism is more similar to forms of quasi-realism than to emotivism. Wollheim re-
mains faithful to our experience of such properties as belonging to the world. In 
this regard, projective properties are close to secondary properties. 
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b) The other form is “complex projection”, which is described in the 
following terms: “A person is […] sad; his sadness causes him anxiety; 
as a result of this anxiety he projects his sadness on to, more general-
ly, the external world; and now, along with no longer believing he is 
sad, perhaps no longer being sad, he begins to experience the exter-
nal world as of a piece of his sadness” (Wollheim 1987: 82). 
Notice that according to these descriptions, the differences be-
tween both kinds of projection can be explained as follows. First, in 
simple projection, the person ends up with a belief (s/he thinks that 
what is really sad is a figure in her/his environment), while in complex 
projection, the person ends up with an experience (s/he experiences 
the world as of a piece of her/his sadness). Secondly, and more im-
portantly, in simple perception, the person ends up believing that 
some figure in the environment possesses exactly the same property 
as the one s/he experiences (in Wollheim’s example the property is 
sadness, but this is not the only property we are able to project – 
other negative and positive properties can also be projected), while in 
complex projection, the property in which the person experiences the 
world is not the same as the one s/he started off by experiencing her-
self/himself. For instance, the person does not experience the world 
as being sad, but as having another property. However, given that this 
other property cannot be explained without the mechanism of com-
plex projection, Wollheim refers to these properties as “projective 
properties” (Wollheim 1987: 83). To summarize, for Wollheim, ex-
pressive perception involves the mechanism of complex projection. In 
fact, expressive perception is described in terms of the perception of 
projective properties.  
 
3.2. Projective properties  
I now turn to Wollheim’s concept of “projective property”, which is 
used to refer to expressive properties. The concept itself underscores 
the underlying process of projection in expressive perception. Accord-
ing to Wollheim, who follows psychoanalytical ideas put forward by 
Freud on this point, the mechanism of projection is an unconscious 
process, which involves the work of phantasy. There is first an initiat-
ing phantasy motivated by an emotion that the subject wants to ei-
ther retain or get rid of. According to this phantasy, the emotion is 
expelled from the body and spreads across the environment. Phanta-
sy is also involved in a second sense: the subject who expels the emo-
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tion has a disposition to fantasize that the world can be experienced 
in a certain way. Wollheim describes it in the following terms: “The 
expulsive phantasy dyes the world, and it is this dye that gives the 
world its new projective properties” (Wollheim 1987: 84). In his later 
work On the emotions (1999), he will defend a view of the emotions 
as unconscious dispositions, which fits with this idea.  
As previously noted, in complex projection, the person experienc-
es the world as having a property which is not the same property as 
that which s/he experienced at the beginning of the process of pro-
jection. Nevertheless, as Wollheim observes, it is common to employ 
the same predicates to refer to a psychological state and to a proper-
ty of our environment. This happens because a “doubling-up of the 
predicate” takes place (Wollheim 1987: 84). Unlike Geiger, for whom 
there is a causal and qualitative linkage between both phenomena, 
Wollheim believes that this doubling-up can be explained as an ex-
ample of how language is idealized. The main danger of this idealiza-
tion is that it leads us to speak metaphorically about the world, and in 
doing so, we end up misunderstanding our experience and thinking 
that this doubling-up is the core of expressive perception. The prob-
lem with this idealization is that we understand expressive perception 
as “the metaphorical application of psychological predicates to the 
world” (Wollheim 1987: 85). The mistake here would be twofold: 
first, we would overlook the fact that expressive perception is a genu-
ine form of seeing; second, we would embrace anthropomorphism 
because of the belief that the predicate for an emotional state and 
for a property of the world are used in the same sense.  
As previously mentioned, Wollheim’s account incorporates the 
notion of artistic intention. In Wollheim’s account, a work of art has 
certain expressive properties because the artist gave it these proper-
ties with the intention that they would correspond to an emotional 
state. As recipients of art works, we are aware of such correspond-
ence when we experience the work as mirroring certain affective 
states14. The intention of the artist thus plays a crucial role in explain-
ing the correct perception of expressive properties in a work of art. 
Wollheim will modify these claims in his later work, arguing that the 
artist should not necessarily experience the emotional condition ex-                                                             
14 Here I follow Budd’s analysis on the notion of “correspondence” in Wollheim’s 
work (see Budd 2008: 240).  
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pressed by the work, nor should the spectator feel compelled to ex-
perience such emotion (Budd 2008: 248). 
 According to this view, there is a relevant connection between 
emotion and pictorial representation. Wollheim explains this connec-
tion in terms of causality. Thoughts, beliefs, memories and emotions 
cause the artist to paint in a certain way and the artist is responsible 
for explaining her intentions. However, the causal connection be-
tween emotion and expressive property in the case of pictorial repre-
sentation differs from the causal connection between emotion and 
the bodily expression of an emotion. In pictorial representation, the 
emotion in question does not have to be experienced by the artist in 
the moment of painting, but can be controlled by recollection and re-
flection. Moreover, with pictorial representation we do not react to 
something within our environment.  
There is a further aspect to the chapter of Painting as an art under 
discussion here, and one to which we should pay attention. Regarding 
the perception of expressive properties, there are relevant similarities 
between the perception of pictorial expression and the perception of 
bodily expression. First, both are forms of expressive perception. 
Moreover, there is a structural resemblance between the two. In 
both cases the perception is answerable to the way the object (the 
picture or the body) looks, how this look corresponds to certain emo-
tions, and what has caused the look. However, in the perception of an 
expressive picture, the spectator is aware that s/he is trying to do 
what the artist tried to do in making the picture, but nothing similar 
takes place in the case of the perception of bodily expression. And 
here again we find an important point of similarity with Geiger, for 
whom grasping a feeling character was substantially different from 
seeing a human face expressing an emotion.  
To understand the originality of Wollheim’s projectionist account, 
we need to broaden our perspective by considering the larger context 
in which it became influential. The majority of analytical accounts ex-
plain expressive properties in terms of their power to elicit certain re-
actions in those who experience them. Expressive properties are in-
terpreted in terms of dispositions to arouse certain emotions. Other 
approaches underscore the link between the expression in art works 
and in human faces and explain expressive properties in terms of a 
structural analogy between the two phenomena (for an overview, see 
Noordhof 2008: 330). It was precisely the latter view that Wollheim 
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criticized, while trying to offer an explanation of how these powers 
are to be found independently of us, within our environment. 
What Wollheim’s and Geiger’s approaches have in common is ul-
timately the idea that we are able to experience expressive properties 
as being independent of our mental condition (characters or projec-
tive properties are not to be assimilated to affective states). Moreo-
ver, both agree in terms of the existence of a sui generis capacity or 
sense that enables us to experience such properties (an ability to 
grasp, the ability to perceive projective properties). This capacity has 
a perceptual moment due to its immediacy, spontaneity, and non-
conceptuality; it also has an affective moment since it is a form of 
feeling toward certain aspects of our environment, but it cannot be 
explained as either a common perception or as an emotion, feeling or 
mood. The main point of disagreement lies in the explanation of how 
such properties are presented as independent of us in experience: for 
Geiger, they are objectively present (realism), whereas for Wollheim, 
we are the ones who, through a complex mechanism of projection, 
have imposed them onto our world (projectionism).  
 
 
4. Concluding remarks  
 
This paper has presented and discussed Geiger’s and Wollheim’s ap-
proaches on the nature of expressive properties. While Geiger devel-
oped his account within the context of early phenomenology and 
embraced a realist position about expressive properties, Wollheim 
developed a projectionist account in the context of Anglo-American 
aesthetics, which was mainly dominated by dispositionalist accounts. 
Despite the striking differences between both authors and their re-
spective intellectual contexts and backgrounds, they share a common 
interest in explaining an important aspect of human experience: 
namely, our capacity to perceive objects of the world as bearers of 
expressive properties. This focus on a description of experience al-
lows us to regard both authors as phenomenologists, though this 
term takes on a different meaning in respect of each of them. In Gei-
ger, it means not only an interest in describing how we experience 
art, but also a direct connection with the philosophical tradition de-
veloped by Husserl, Pfänder, and his followers, while in Wollheim, it 
means an interest in taking the description of human experience as a 
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point of departure for philosophical analysis. Both share similar intui-
tions about how we experience objects of art as embodying expres-
sive properties and both are interested in developing accounts that 
explain how expressive perception occurs. Hence, there are enough 
parallels for us to bridge the divide between phenomenology and An-
glo-American aesthetics. I hope to have shown here that not only is it 
possible to build bridges between both traditions, but these bridges 
can also motivate a fruitful and inspiring dialogue.  
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